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The quest for an all-encompassing theory, finally intended to give a solution to the problem of the unification of all natural forces, is seen today as one of the most important objectives of theoretical high-energy physics. This so-called 'Theory of Everything' is, actually, identified by some theoretical physicists with superstring theory. But superstring theory is in a crucial way incomplete. And, above all, it has fundamental problems with empirical testability – problems that make questionable its status as a physical theory at all.





Superstring Theory and Empirical Testability


The quest for an all-encompassing theory is seen today as one of the most important objectives of theoretical high-energy physics. This so-called 'Theory of Everything' is, actually, identified by some theoretical physicists with superstring theory (Greene 1999, Kaku 1998, Polchinski 1998, Witten 1997, Hatfield 1992, Barrow 1991, Davies/Brown 1988, Green/Schwarz/Witten 1987, Schwarz 1987, Green, 1986, Green 1985, Schwarz 1985). With this conception, in particular, a unification of the description of all fundamental interaction forces shall be achieved. Superstring theory is a theory whose fundamental one-dimensional, oscillatory entities (the so-called strings) determine the dynamics on the Planck-energy-scale. Superstring theory is supersymmetric (Kane 2000). So, superstring theory consequently postulates hitherto unknown supersymmetric partners to our known elementary particles. 

Because of mathematical and physical consistency requirements, the current formulation of superstring theory embeds the dynamics of its elementary constituents into a higher-dimensional spacetime. Except for the four dimensions of regular spacetime, the extra dimensions of this ten-dimensional spacetime of superstring theory are compactified on the microscopic level in the form of so-called Calabi-Yau-Spaces.

Also, an advanced version of superstring theory is discussed. It is known, actually, under the name of 'M-Theory' (Duff 1999, Greene 1999, Duff 1998, Kaku 1998, Polchinski 1998, Witten 1997). Edward Witten, a theoretical physicist and one of the main protagonists of the so-called 'Second Supersting Revolution' (i.e. the duality-induced insight into the relations between different formulations of superstring theory and the entailed shift from superstring theory to M-Theory; the first Superstring Revolution during the eighties led from the hadronic string theory of Gabriele Veneziano to the comprehensive string-based unification approaches of superstring theory), wrote with regard to M-Theory:





Within superstring theory the strings are seen as the fundamental constituents of the material universe. Their dynamics are seen as the basis of the realization of the most fundamental processes of nature. Hitherto, within high-energy physics, the old Democritean Program of a search for the most fundamental constituents of matter found its expression in our so-called elementary particles. These elementary particles are now identified within the context of superstring theory as the quantized oscillatory eigenstates of the string. They are derived, secondary entities. Fundamental are only the string and its dynamics.

The conceptual basis of M-Theory takes also into account fundamental entities with higher dimensions than strings. The most basic of them are two-dimensional oscillatory membranes. Because the dynamics of these higher-dimensional objects go along with significantly higher energies than the dynamics of strings, these objects occur with a significantly lesser quantum mechanical probability than strings. So the exclusive consideration of the dynamics of strings leads to a good approximation to M-Theory. It gives a description of the by far most probable processes to expect within M-Theory. But for both conceptual approaches, superstring theory and M-Theory, there do not exist any fundamental equations. The relation between superstring theory and M-Theory is no more than an interesting conceptual hypothesis. Within this hypothesis, the question 'Well, if nature doesn't consist of point particles, why should we rely on strings?' would lead to a democratic answer: 'Everything is possible, everything occurs in nature; but connected to different energies and to different probabilities of occurrence!'









So, which requirements and criteria has a scientific theory, and, in particular, a fundamental physical theory, to take into account? With truth everything would be most simple. Our theories had only to be true. They had only to describe nature as it is. Everything else would follow from this fact, especially the logical consistency, the structural coherence and the empirical adequacy of our theories. There would be only one true and complete description of nature. Our fundamental theory would be our most basic and at the same time our most comprehensive theory. All possible other theories which we would formulate for special conditions or which we would need because of their practicability would, in the ideal case, be implications of this fundamental theory. The basis for the reliability of our fundamental theory would be its truth. There would necessarily exist one final and fundamental true theory about nature.

But this presupposes, that nature does not play a trick on us by falling apart into disparate sections, into autonomous realms to which we could only do justice by the application of a plurality of autonomous theoretical forms of description. In this case our final and all-encompassing theory would be at best the summation of all these autonomous singular theories: a collection. This certainly is not intended with the intuition behind the concept of a fundamental theory.









What if we could find any criterion with the strength and clearness intended with that of truth, but without its conceptual problems? Could it not be that anyway only one consistent description of nature is possible because of mathematical or information theoretical constraints? Everything else would then result from this fundamental conceptual constraint and its implications. Would then the only requirements, our fundamental theory has to satisfy, be those of logical consistency and of most advanced universality? This is an idea, which was favored by some of the proponents of superstring theory during the early steps of its development. The following remark, for example, one can find within a popular article of Michael B. Green, one of the inventors of superstring theory:

'[...] the unification of the forces is accomplished in a way determined almost uniquely by the logical requirement that the theory be internally consistent.' (Green 1986, 44)

Green writes at another passage of the same article:

'Much of the interest in superstring theories follows from the rich structure that results by requiring the theory to be consistent. [...] The fact that the quantum consistency of a theory including gravity leads to an almost unique prediction of the unifying symmetry group was an exciting development. It has led to the current wave of enthusiasm for superstring theory.' (52f)

The idea is the following: Because of basic structural restrictions of consistent possibilities, nature can necessarily only have the features it actually has. The unambiguity of the features of our world is given because of the fact, that only one possible world can consistently exist: at the same time the best and the worst of all possible worlds, simply the one and only possible world. Because only this specific world is possible, there can only exist one all-encompassing, consistent description for possible worlds.





Anyhow, without the requirement of empirical adequacy one cannot reach the goal. But, would the requirements of coherence and, above all, of empirical adequacy - together with that of greatest universality - lead to a complete determination of an adequate description of nature? 





What if we add to our catalogue, which already contains coherence, universality and empirical adequacy, the requirement of the simplicity of our theoretical hypotheses and that of conceptual and structural parsimony?













The consequences: Probably there does not exist any definitive catalogue of requirements for scientific theories, and especially for fundamental physical theories, which guarantees certainty with regard to an adequate description of nature. Every criterion can, in particular in isolation, be criticized and dismantled, so that at the end our chances to do science in the traditional way look totally hopeless. But finally, this demonstrates, above all, that those criteria find their justification and their strength not in isolation but only in cooperation. And it is never a definitive justification. There is no certainty and no guarantee for success. We have to accept some risks, if we do not intend to do science as an intellectual game like many others, but in the sense of a science with descriptive, explanatory and prognosticistic objectives. If we are willing to stay to our traditional scientific ideals, then we do our best, if we find a profile of requirements for our theories supporting just these traditional objectives of science. If the desired result can be achieved in this way, is admittedly a question that cannot be decided definitively. The results of a chosen catalogue of requirements can show up only in their application. Therefore the following collection should be seen as a minimal catalogue of requirements that could, under consideration of their mutual cooperation, serve as basic instruments for a decision between possible candidates for a fundamental physical theory. All those criteria not achievable in science according to our epistemological convictions - like the truth of our descriptions of nature - consequently do not find place in this catalogue. So, the requirements that should be fulfilled for fundamental physical theories are at least the following:

1. Consistency and coherence:

















5.a. Conceptual and structural parsimony:

The relevant maxim with regard to the parsimony of entities and structures, scientific theories talk about, is Occam's Razor: 'Pluralitas non est ponenda sine necessitate.' - The number of entities a theory postulates has to be kept minimal with regard to the specific subject the theory deals with, while maintaining the power of explanation.

5.b. Simplicity of theoretical hypotheses:

In the case of equal power of explanation, the most simple theory and the most simple hypotheses, which are completely compatible with the empirical data relevant for the subject chosen by the theory, have to be favored above all competitors.









Superstring theory meets without doubt the criterion of universality. It has as its objective the unification of all fundamental forces. At least with regard to its conceptual orientation, it achieves this objective. That means, at least in the case of success of this program, it has an explanative power more developed than that of the historically preceding candidates for a fundamental physical theory. Quantum field theories did not lead to such a comprehensive unification. With superstring theory the nomologization is carried out to the most advanced degree.





With regard to the regulative requirements that are of particular importance for fundamental theories, superstring theory obviously does not meet any decisive problems. The simplicity of the hypotheses involved is one of the leading maxims for the development of theories within physics, as it is as well their conceptual and structural parsimony.

With regard to its parsimony, superstring theory even shows at least two advantages: On the one hand, the unification of the fundamental forces of interaction, realized at least conceptually within superstring theory, means simply a minimization of the number of theories which are necessary for a dynamical description of these fundamental forces. On the other hand, superstring theory has the advantage that it needs only one basic entity: the string. It intends to deduce the existence and the dynamics of all fermionic particles of matter and of all interaction bosons from the string dynamics and its different oscillatory states. In comparison, within the quantum field theoretical approaches to a unification of forces, the elementary particles and their dynamics formed a rather pluralistic spectrum of basic entities, which finally had to remain unexplained within this context. 













The first of these areas is the following: It is mathematically and physically unclear, how the transition from the ten dimensions of superstring theory to the four dimensions of our phenomenological spacetime is explicitly realized. It is also physically unclear, why such a transition is finally necessary. It is not, because we obviously live within a ten-dimensional spacetime, that superstring theory works with it. Rather, it is, because the mathematical and dynamical concepts of this theoretical approach work consistently only within such a higher-dimensional space.

In principle, there exist the most different mathematical ideas for the modalities of a compactification of the surplus dimensions, each of which would have to be interpreted with regard to its physical content. All these modalities do not only bring along with them their specific intrinsic mathematical problems, but, above all, with regard to a scientific description of nature they represent an additional moment of arbitrariness and contingency. Finally, the relevant modalities of the folding-up of the surplus dimensions of spacetime are simply unknown, as well as the reasons for this folding-up - respectively the unfolded condition of our four-dimensional phenomenological spacetime. In principle, a very large number of (six-dimensional) Calabi-Yau-Spaces with very complicated topologies could be relevant for this compactification of the surplus spacetime-dimensions. These topologies can be ordered into about ten thousand topological types. According to our present knowledge, these different modes of compactification lead in general to totally different physical results. They describe in general totally different worlds with different spectra of fermionic and bosonic particles, different particle masses and different cosmologies. So, strictly seen, we have, actually, the same number of superstring theories as we have topological types of compactification with totally different physical results: about ten thousand. Not only because of this reason the actual theoretical investigations within the context of superstring theory consist to a significant amount in approaches to solutions of problems of the only partially developed mathematics of Calabi-Yau-Spaces and their respective physical interpretation. 

The numerical deductions hoped for within superstring theory crucially depend on the specific mode of compactification. These numerical deductions concern in particular the number of elementary particles and the number of families or generations of particles to be expected. They concern as well the uncertain perspective on a possible calculation of particle masses. But the decisive determination of a mode of compactification is still totally unclear within superstring theory. And it is not a decision between three or five alternatives, which could be calculated through. Rather, it is a decision between more or less ten thousand possible modes of compactification. And these can, according to the actual mathematical state of the art (and possibly not only to this), not be calculated throughout.





But there exists still another important area of problems for superstring theory: The fundamental equations of superstring theory, which should describe, on the one hand, the dynamics of its oscillatory constituents, and, on the other hand, the dynamics of spacetime structures, are simply unknown. Some theoretical physicists (e.g. Witten 1988; cf. Matthews 1994) believe that we do not yet have at our disposal the adequate mathematical tools really to comprehend and to handle those fundamental equations that are bravely postulated in their existence in advance.

The approaches to superstring theory, actually existing, use a plurality of approximative equations. But it is in no way clear what these equations are approximations to. Not even the fundamental coupling constants are known. And that is not all: The approximative dynamical equations which superstring theory uses do not have any solutions that could be attained by means of analytical methods. In a strict sense, superstring theory therefore has no testable results. Not alone, that we don't have any exact equations and that we don't know the coupling constants. It is not even possible to deduce from the approximative equations that we actually have any solutions that could be set in relation to any empirically investigable area.

An examination of this problem in a less strict sense does not lead to much better results: The theory is only empirically testable in a very indirect form. Superstring theory deals with a dynamics which not only has no analytical solutions, but which describes processes within an energy range which, on principle, we have no direct access to. What we can test in the best case with our particle accelerators - those in construction, those planned and those proposed - are not any possible direct predictions of the theory. If at all, we only can test very indirect consequences of the theory: consequences which concern an accessible energy range and a conceptual level about which, in almost every case, the theory itself does not make any direct statement.

As all supersymmetric theories do, superstring theory claims the existence of (relatively massive) superpartners to our known matter and interaction particles. But if in the future the existence of such superpartners finally could be proved by means of our particle accelerators, this would not necessarily have to be judged as an unambiguous confirmation of superstring theory, but only as a confirmation of the concept of supersymmetry. Only a direct numerical prediction of the masses to be expected for these superpartners could, together with their experimental confirmation, change this situation. But, superstring theory is not separated from this area of numerical prediction and of experimental proof by only a little mathematical problem, but, rather, by a lot of conceptual uncertainties. All the more daring appears the claim that it is the definitive solution to the quest for a 'Theory of Everything'.

Between the energy range the theory describes directly or indirectly and that which could be accessible to our experiments at any future time we have more or less sixteen or eighteen decimal scales of difference. And this fact will probably never change in a decisive way. To make the energy range superstring theory deals with accessible to our experiments we would have to produce an artificial big bang. It is this fact that makes clear that the only promising possibility to reach at a relevant empirical test of superstring theory probably consists in its possible cosmological implications that theoretical physicists will have to look for. But also a possible discovery of cosmological implications of the theory would lead only to an indirect form of empirical testability, carried out under consideration of many additional hypotheses. We would finally test an entire bunch of most different hypotheses, totally undistinguishable in their consequences from the consequences of superstring theory itself. So we will never be able to test superstring theory in a more or less direct way. Many inferential conclusions, and therefore the assumption of their reliability, are necessary, if we intend to reach any empirical data relevant for the test of superstring theory. Numerical predictions that could be subject to a direct empirical test don't exist and they are not even to be expected in the future. So, the identification of explicit cases for a possible falsification of the theory is very problematic.





With regard to superstring theory, the requirements of empirical testability and of empirical adequacy are obviously forced to a rather chimerical existence. This could be changed only with new and surprising possibilities of confirmation or falsification, e.g. in the context of quantum cosmology. The derivation of direct numerical predictions via analytical or approximative solutions to any fundamental equation of superstring theory - a derivation that finally could lead to a direct experimental proof - is not to be expected, if we take seriously all that we know about these theories and the things they deal with. If we, finally, will find new means for an experimental proof, so it will be via indirect consequences that concern areas probably far away from the original subject of a unified theory. And then, it will always be the question what it is that we test experimentally. It is a long way from the mathematics of Calabi-Yau-Spaces and their topology to the world of high-energy particle accelerators - much longer than from the Lagrange densities of quantum field theory to an experimental investigation of energy spectra.

Probably this was one of the reasons that led some theoretical physicists to the assumption that the requirement of logical consistency alone would be sufficient to identify one theory unambiguously as appropriate candidate for the status of a fundamental theory - given the level of universality those theories deal with. It is not so easy, according to these physicists, to find any consistent theory at all with the intended level of universality. So, any consistent theory found under these conditions would very probably, as they suggested, be the fundamental theory: the one and only true 'Theory of Everything'.





Until now, we left apart one further specific problem: That of superstring theory as a 'Theory of Everything'. The most severe problem for such a declared 'Theory of Everything' results from the unlimited universality claimed for it and from the reductionistic connotations of this claim. 

The actual situation in science possibly raises hopes of a partial success of the reductionistic program (Oppenheim/Putnam 1958). We can establish at least some relevant reductionistic relations between, on the one hand, the different aspects of a description of our world that are given within the different scientific disciplines and, on the other hand, the description given by physics which is, according to the reductionistic view, our basic scientific discipline. Such a success in our intentions to establish reductionistic relations, aiming at the description given by a fundamental theory, is one of the direct implications of the talk about a 'Theory of Everything'.

But the actual and possible successes within the reductionistic program, most certainly, will not lead to a complete reduction of all autonomous forms of a scientific description of parts or aspects of our world to a singular fundamental theory. And not in any way successful will the reductionistic program be with regard to the many disciplines outside the narrow spectrum of the natural sciences. Those disciplines not only resist in many ways our attempts to a throughout successful nomologization, they not even can be brought into an unambiguous hierarchical order in relation to physics as a putative fundamental discipline. But such a hierarchical order forms the basis for the establishment of a claim of successive reductions, leading finally to the chosen descriptive basis. So, finally, the reductionism claimed with the talk about a 'Theory of Everything' has to remain no more than a metaphysical program, unachievable within the context of our science.





But also the talk about a fundamental physical theory that avoids this reductionistic arrogance is only then appropriate, if at least the criteria of empirical testability and of empirical adequacy can be fulfilled. Otherwise, however elegant and consistent our theories may be, without empirical control they are nothing more (and nothing less) than mathematical structures. They are, at best, a piece of natural metaphysics inspired by mathematics and the structural sciences: a piece of metaphysics still to be interpreted.

With this I do not intend to express a debasement of metaphysics. I will only emphasize that metaphysical conceptions don't have any dominant tradition within physics for at least the last 150 years. And, there is a reason for this absence of a strong metaphysical tradition within modern physics: Metaphysical conceptions which pretend to be physical theories enforce in a new way an old and already well-known problem: that of a realistic interpretability of the statements of scientific theories with regard to their correlates in nature. This problem, although because of different reasons, was already of great importance for the advanced physical theories of the twentieth century, in particular for quantum mechanics. With the new generation of a metaphysical physics it now gets totally out of control.

For superstring theory, as it appears nowadays, it is more or less completely unclear which of its theoretical statements and which of its implications we should have to interpret in a realistic way as descriptions of real natural facts, and which not. Does the theory describe factual structures of the world? That means, does it fulfill the original objectives of a physical description of nature? Or does it describe mathematical and cognitive substructures, which - as well as the entities postulated within these substructures - do not have any correlate in nature? (The latter case would not even totally exclude that we possibly could gain, in form of secondary derivations, adequate statements about our world from the fabric of the theory, at least for some instances.) Or is superstring theory a not yet fully explainable mixture of these two alternatives? If this would be the case: Which statements belong to the realistic and which to the instrumentalistic side of the theory? In other words: How far does it represent an original form of physics?

Perhaps the development of physics shows just in the successive attempts at a unification, ending in superstring theory, that a consequent pursuit of the original objectives of this discipline necessarily leads to a process which finally is forced to transcend its own conceptual foundations. Does perhaps physics have to transcend necessarily, at a certain point of its development, the rules of an empirical scientific approach aiming at a realistically interpretable description of nature? And does it therefore, finally, have to lead to a metaphysical conception that leaves behind the conditions of a thoroughgoing empirical testability? It is not clear how these questions could be answered definitively.

But, if it is metaphysics - possibly very interesting and innovative metaphysics - one wants to do or one has to do, because there does not exist any other possibility that would not leave apart the original objectives, so it probably should not be declared as physics. Rather, it should be made recognizable as metaphysics. Or one should defer ambitious claims with regard to the status of a new scientific construct at least as long as a metaphysical as well as mathematical idea and inspiration needs to mutate to a constitutive part of a scientifically sound and empirically supported description of nature. Or - what cannot be excluded with certainty - one should wait as long as it takes for this idea to be identified as useless with regard to its scientific relevance. But, even if they finally don't lead to the intended goal, the conceptions of superstring theory will probably contribute to developments that could be important for a physics of the future. One of the reasons for such an innovative potential lies certainly in the various experiences with new physical ideas and concepts as well as with new mathematical instruments: innovations the superstring approach stands for. However, it is possible that future physics may be oriented to totally different directions, but, as I hope, under reestablishment of empirical control.







I am indebted to the Center for Philosophy of Science of the University of Pittsburgh and to its Visiting Fellowship Program, which enabled and inspired the writing of this paper.
Parts of the text are based on a talk given at the Center for Philosophy of Science Lunchtime Colloquium in January 2002 during my stay as a Visiting Fellow.
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